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I
If we are concerned with democracy, then autonomy is a concept of crucial interest
to us. If we take Jürgen Habermas as the main influence with regard to the idea of
deliberative democracy, we can see in his work the tendency to place the problem
of autonomy in a communicative (or interactive) context: it would have to do with
a relationship between autonomous subjects, in which the condition of being a sub-
ject, and so of being autonomous, is preserved in the case of each of the participants,
by contrast to the instrumental (or work) context, which involves a relationship
between subjects and objects. Of course, there is also the possibility of speaking of
strategic interaction, where other people (other subjects) are frequently dealt with as
objects, even though effectiveness in dealing with them may require that their capac-
ity as subjects be taken into account.
In any case, some difficult questions emerge right away if we start from the con-
trast between instrumentality and communication. To begin with, it is hard to keep
the two contexts analytically apart from each other. Even Habermas’ “ideal speech
situation” (where any element of power is supposed to have been eliminated and the
only thing to count is the force of the better argument) is, of course, a desideratum
to be instrumentally achieved (if at all), and communicative action is also action,
which means that it inevitably involves itself a problem of efficacy: we have norms
and sanctions aimed at ensuring the autonomy of all, and the ideal speech situation
supposedly creates, in Habermas’ own words, competent communication, despite the
fact that the attribute of being competent or incompetent is in principle, for
Fábio W. Reis
DELIBERATION, INTERESTS AND PLURALISM? *
ESP1_p131_152.qxd  11/3/05  21:39  Page 1
Revista Direito GV, São Paulo, p. 131-152, 2005. Edição especial 1. 
DELIBERATION, INTERESTS AND PLURALISM? : FÁBIO W. REIS132
Habermas, something that characterizes the observance of technical rules (in work)
or of valid strategies, that is, the sphere of instrumentality.1
Moreover, it seems impossible to keep the value of autonomy, as such, apart
from the strategic level, or the level of “self-affirmation” (to take Habermas’ defini-
tion of interests, which was previously formulated in a similar way by Alessandro
Pizzorno in terms of “distinguishing oneself ”).2 There are two apparently contrast-
ing meanings associated with “autonomy”. The first is autonomy as self-affirmation:
we deal here with an actor who is capable of just following her impulses (or spon-
taneously affirming herself), and autonomy in this sense is akin to the idea of power
as something that allows the actor not to have to learn.3 The other is autonomy as
self-control, involving the idea of impulsiveness being restrained by a compulsion
that is to some degree chosen and therefore the result of a reflective posture (or by
norms that are chosen and so of one’s own responsibility, in accordance with the ety-
mology of the word “autonomy”).
Now, despite the apparent contrast between the two meanings, some interesting
insights may be gained if we relate the ambiguity they bring about to the difficulties
faced by Habermas himself in his attempt to distinguish between “public” autonomy
and “private” autonomy in Between Facts and Norms.4 Even though the idea of repub-
lican virtue (with its affinity to communicative deliberation not contaminated by
strategy, interests and power) favors the idea of autonomy as self-control, which
suggests the restraint on my impulsiveness produced by paying attention to the con-
nection between my self-interests and the interests or goals of the collectivity, will
it actually be possible meaningfully to speak of autonomy without reference to any
component of self-affirmation? Habermas sustains that the realization of supposed-
ly “political” or “public” autonomy involves the affirmation of citizens in the politi-
cal sphere, in the capacity of authors of the law (which would be a necessary condi-
tion for private autonomy to exist at all); can this be seen as involving autonomy in
a way that actually eschews the component of self-affirmation, regardless of the fact
that this “self ” may refer to an identity or an ideal of life that turns out to be large-
ly conditioned by the immersion in the collectivity? Even if we stress the connection
between autonomy and reflectiveness, the “noble” idea itself of autonomy as self-
control can be shown to assume (as is very clearly the case in the theory of moral
development elaborated by Habermas himself, on the basis of the work of Lawrence
Kohlberg and Jean Piaget)5 the ability on the part of individuals to “decenter” and
detach from society and its conventional norms in “post-conventional” morality. It
thus supposes choice with regard to one’s very identity – with inevitable ambiguity
as to the relationship between the aspect of self-affirmation and the component of
selflessness that the idea of self-control also evidently contains. Can the distinction
between private autonomy and public or political autonomy be effectively sustained
in the context of such questions?
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This suggestion (the connection between autonomy, on the one hand, and reflec-
tiveness and detachment with regard to society, on the other) can itself be linked to
the problems dealt with in the literature of which Timur Kuran’s book on Private
Truths, Public Lies is an important recent example.6 Kuran’s central concern is the
oppressive character that “public opinion” may acquire, with the pressures exerted
by it upon individuals leading to the falsification of “private opinion”.The conditions
in which this can be seen to occur range from the phenomenon of “pluralistic igno-
rance” produced by authoritarian censorship and repression in the countries of “real
socialism” or other political dictatorships (making it impossible for people to have
an accurate evaluation of the degree of support with which the regime actually
counts among the population) to the opinions deemed to be “politically correct” in
democratic countries, private adherence to which, as shown by survey researches, is
often much less widespread than one would think by looking at their public effects.
Of course, the phenomena pointed at in Kuran’s work and its antecedents are in
clear contrast to an idealized conception of the “public sphere” as being character-
ized, to any important degree, by political judgments supposedly resulting from
authentic arguments. And the outcome is that, from the point of view of the demo-
cratic ideal and of autonomy as a value, what we have to face in the relationship
between public opinion and private opinion is, again, at least ambiguous: if, on the
one hand, the old findings and suggestions on pluralistic ignorance, as well as their
recent use by Kuran and others, point to the libertarian potential of the unimpeded
flux of communication among citizens, on the other hand we are reminded by obser-
vations such as those on the “politically correct” of the themes of the “psychology of
crowds”, and of the sense in which, for instance, the secret vote (by protecting pri-
vate opinion, one might say, from public opinion) is a democratic achievement.
If we think of the notion of citizenship, these ambiguities with regard to the idea
of autonomy (public or political versus private autonomy, the potential benefits of
communication for autonomy versus the undesirable pressures of public opinion)
assume a neat character in connection with the different meanings of “citizenship” in
the context of the liberal and republican traditions, which were the object of
Benjamin Constant’s classic essay on the liberty of the ancients and of the moderns.
Years ago, George A. Kelly transposed these different meanings in terms of a dis-
tinction between the “civil” and “civic” concepts or dimensions of citizenship.7 The
“civil” dimension of citizenship (liberal and “privatist” in inspiration) is the one to
stress the modern value of autonomy of the citizen before the other citizens and
before the state.The real citizen, in this perspective, is that capable of affirming her-
self by her own means, who claims her rights or seeks to promote whatever interests
she has, being able to mobilize in an independent way resources that are controlled
by her in the private sphere or in the market. By contrast, the “civic” dimension of
citizenship refers to the value of the civic virtue supposed to characterize the classic
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Greek polis and the Roman republic. Instead of the idea of rights, the idea of soli-
darity and of the duties of the citizen would prevail in this case, and the real citizen
would rather be the one who acts in accordance with his (the masculine gender is
imperative if we deal with classic citizenship…) responsibilities before the collectiv-
ity, if necessary with personal sacrifices – even, in the limit, the sacrifice of life itself.
Current discussions on citizenship and related subjects have been strongly
marked by the ambivalence and tension produced by the simultaneous adherence to
the values corresponding to each of the two dimensions, civil and civic,
liberal and republican.We have, on the “civil” side, the value involved in the idea of
citizenship as autonomy and self-affirmation, which contains, however, the counter-
part of its affinity to egoism and “privatism”. On the other side, we have the value
corresponding to the cohesive and altruistic substratum of citizenship as civic virtue.
If, even in the classic polis, the safety of each depended on the collectivity’s being
capable of acting in a united or joint way, today this value has an important concrete
expression in the welfare state or, more generally, in the social content that citizen-
ship came to acquire and that T. H. Marshall linked to achieving the status of full and
equal member of the national community, instead of the give and take proper to the
market. But the value of solidarity has, in turn, the counterpart of individual
dependence, which, in the welfare state, appears in the protection given by the state,
in its capacity as the agent of the community, to those who are somehow incapable
of fully and independently affirming themselves. More or less recent analyses of the
theme of citizenship, especially in the literature concerned with social policies by
the state, tend to move, often in a confusing and incoherent way, within the space
distinguished by the tension between the two values.8
II 
Now, stressing the relevance of strategic aspects is not tantamount to denying, in an
abstract doctrinaire level, the crucial importance of communication and debate as
an ultimate reference of the democratic ideal and its emphasis on autonomy.
Actually, the idea of a process of collective deliberation guided by the search for
unanimous agreement is inevitably present, I think, as an underlying utopian
assumption of the very idea of politics. In this perspective, defining the object itself
of political science necessarily involves a critical posture, and the conventional and
trivially “realistic” reference to power relationships as the defining element of poli-
tics in handbooks of political science can only be seen as adequate if it is understood
as involving the assumption that power is a problem to be dealt with at the practical
level: we would have no politics in a society of slaves where the latter had no chance
whatsoever of ceasing to be slaves and affirming themselves autonomously. In other
words, there are good reasons to recover Hannah Arendt’s Aristotelian insight, based
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on an idealized view of the classic agora, of politics as a process of communication
among equals which excludes power (to which Habermas is indebted, as recognized
by him).9 Of course, the big issue is how to reconcile this attractive insight with the
diffuse presence of the strategic ingredients stressed by the “realistic” conception of
politics – or, more abstractly, how appropriately to grasp the ubiquitous play
involved in such dichotomies as friend and foe, speech and communication in con-
trast to potential or actual violence, solidarity and convergence in contrast to inter-
ests and conflict, autonomy in contrast to civic virtue.
In any case, if we start from the principle of unanimous agreement, strict adher-
ence to it is clearly impossible in most circumstances of daily socio-political life. But
collective debate or deliberation can be shown to underlie as an assumption the two
most important procedures through which realistic accommodations of the utopian
ideal of unanimous agreement are sought. The first is majority rule, which is clear-
ly based on viewing unanimity as something capable of occurring in different
degrees: the more votes in a certain direction, the “more unanimous” the decision
(otherwise, there would be no reason to give precedence to the preferences of the
majority over those of the minority and to adopt the former as the preferences of
the whole collectivity). The other one, akin to old conceptions regarding the
philosopher-king, has to do with assumptions as to where (or whom) better argu-
ments would come from: since it is impossible actually to discuss and deliberate in
an appropriately lengthy way, let us delegate the decisions to people of greater
knowledge in the relevant fields (the physician, the judge and so on, or perhaps just
people that we choose as our representatives and leaders and to whom we give the
conditions needed for them to devote themselves to the issues to be decided upon).
It is useful to stress the affinity of this perspective to Robert Dahl’s examination,
many years ago, of the criteria that should guide the democratic organization of a
society.10 In Dahl’s view, they are the criteria of personal choice, economy and com-
petence, which I interpret here in a somewhat free way.
The criterion of personal choice clearly refers to the idea of autonomy as a cen-
tral value. In principle, those decisions in which I am concerned are to be made by
myself. Since, however, the same principle applies to all, in collective decisions (that
is, in situations in which debate should ideally take place) the practical translation of
the principle leads to the idea of political equality and to the search for rules akin to
it: unanimity and veto rights, if possible, or, more realistically, majority rule. Let us
note here, however, that there is an important alternative in which the criterion is
satisfied outside the sphere of debate and dispensing with debate. I refer to the mar-
ket, or to market-like mechanisms, in the operation of which, instead of deliberat-
ing together, debating and perhaps voting, people just act on their own and do as they
please, with spontaneous adjustments to each other’s behavior (in the formula
adopted by Adam Przeworski to define the concept of “equilibrium” in a paper of a
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few years ago, “everyone does what is best for himself or herself given what the oth-
ers do”).11 Of course, market mechanisms involve risks of denial of the possibility
of personal choice: not only is everyone exposed to the inconveniences or (in the
language of economists) “externalities” stemming from the free behavior of others
and its consequences at the aggregate level, but also “what the others do” may result
in introducing elements of power and inequality, with monopolies and oligopolies.
But, if the market presents such “external” costs, organizing and having people par-
ticipate in collective decision-making has its own (“internal”) costs, which lead to
the need to resort to another of the three criteria, the one of economy.
The criterion of economy emphasizes precisely the costs involved in collective
decisions and seeks to reduce them. In contrast to the frequent adherence without
qualifications to participation as a desideratum (which tends to forget the value of
being able just to go home and be left alone…), a society that required full-time
devotion to collective deliberations would be clearly problematical, and the ques-
tion then becomes the one of establishing which degree of public involvement would
be adequate to ensure that the interests or basic values of each (that is, autonomy)
be preserved. Obviously, it is the criterion of economy that points to the problems
related to the need for realistic accommodation of the utopian model of deliberation
in different cases. It is clearly involved in majority voting as a compromise both with
regard to unanimity and, in the case of the electoral choice of leaders, in the realis-
tic acceptance of representation, instead of forms of direct deliberation by all that an
ambitious conception of the deliberative ideal tends to envisage. But delegation
based on competence, the remaining criterion discussed by Dahl, can also be viewed
as justified, in the last analysis, by considerations of costs.
The criterion of competence has to do with the supposedly superior qualification
of some people or their greater control of relevant information as a reason for dele-
gating decisions to them, in line with the philosopher- king perspective mentioned
above. Its connection to the idea of costs is clear enough, since nobody can be expect-
ed to be able to invest at any given moment the amount of energy and resources
needed for arriving by herself at good decisions on the problems that emerge. But,
though this is not stressed by Dahl himself, reference to the criterion of competence
introduces in a particularly clear way a problem that is present whenever we have
representation and decision by some people on behalf of others. Of course, the mere
fact that someone else is better informed on a certain subject would hardly be a rea-
son for me to accept her decision on my behalf if I could not assume that she identi-
fies with me and does indeed have my best interests in mind – otherwise, her greater
knowledge or information may actually be something to be feared by me.
An important aspect of the problems that hinge upon this has to do with the
theme of technocracy (a salient concern, of course, of the tradition of thought,
including the so- called Frankfurt School, to which many of Habermas’ ideas are
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related). A crucial characteristic of a technocratic perspective may be pointed out in
the tendency to assume that the ends are given and non-problematic, whence it
would follow that the relevant issue is the degree of “technical” knowledge or infor-
mation concerning the means to achieve the ends. On the contrary, democracy is
based on the assumption that the ends are problematic: relevant ends are numerous,
pertaining to different and occasionally antagonistic collectivities of various sorts
and to the many individuals, and the decisive challenge is then the one of how to rec-
oncile and accommodate these multiple ends. Of course, with regard to the defini-
tion of ends themselves it could hardly be sustained that experts or specialists should
be given precedence over ordinary citizens. This has important implications for the
role of cognitive resources in connection to the general theme of democracy, par-
ticipation and deliberation: whatever the realistic reservations to be introduced as to
more radical or ambitious formulations of the deliberative ideal, there inevitably
remains, to some extent, the need for mechanisms that may allow ordinary people
to be able at least to inquire about and obtain an appropriate grasp of the way in
which different policies as “means” (perhaps at different levels of more or less com-
plex chains of ends and means) articulate themselves with the “ultimate” ends to be
pursued – if need be by properly interrogating the experts.
But, even if we put aside the specific issue of technocracy, the general problem
posed by representation maintains itself. Either we must assume an extraordinary
degree of identification between representatives and represented or some form of
control of the former by the latter will be necessary. Access to different degrees of
information combined with the lack of complete identification and trust in the rela-
tionships between representatives and represented is, of course, the central point of
the so-called principal-agent theory, elaborated in such new fields as Joseph Stiglitz’s
“information economics” (or, in general, in what some have called “post-Walrasian
economics”).12 Problems relating to this are clearly important in the life of eco-
nomic corporations, as is the case, for instance, in the relationships between owners
and managers. But they are also crucial, of course, in the political sphere, above all
with regard to the relationships between citizens as principals and elected officials
as agents: which mechanisms will be necessary to assure responsiveness and
accountability on the part of the latter?13
III 
Whatever the difficulties in trying to translate into practice the ideal of free and
“authentic” debate, we already have at play, in the institutional apparatus of demo-
cratic states, many arrangements in which the deliberative ideal is approached in
some degree and mechanisms suggested by criteria like Dahl’s ones are combined in
different ways.Thus, we have the legislative arena (parliament or congress), marked
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by an explicit deliberative intent, though based on the representation of interests
and collective identities by means of elections and often resorting to majority rule;
the judicial sphere, with frequent recourse to the presumption of special compe-
tence in the figure of the magistrate, but also with the popular jury in which repre-
sentation of opinions and identities is somehow introduced, despite the role of open
contest and debate; spaces (councils in several niches of the state apparatus, or in
institutions like the universities) where deliberation often gets actually close to a
consensual or unanimity principle; and so on.
In connection with this variegated institutional experimentation, some prob-
lems of special interest emerge with regard to both the tensions and peculiar link-
ages between the search for authentic debate, on the one hand, and the “realistic”
representation of interests and identities, on the other.
To begin with, there are the problems raised by “legal realism”, discussed by
Ronald Dworkin in Taking Rights Seriously and emphasized by Francis Sejersted, some
years ago, in a discussion of the transition from liberal constitutionalism to corporate
pluralism in the case of Norway.14 The basic point is that we may have better condi-
tions for effective democratic deliberation and collective decision-making (that is, for
debate in which different points of view are effectively taken into account) if we give
proper representation to the interests affected by the decisions, that is, if we democ-
ratize deliberation. Of course, this point is trivial in a certain light, for it lies behind
the very idea of representation in general. But, as pointed out by Sejersted, “this prin-
ciple is in conflict with the liberal notion of the impartial judge saying that those who
have particular interests in a case should be regarded as disqualified to decide in this
case”.15 And it must be added that it is also in conflict with the idealized view of
debate based on the mere force of arguments, for to assume the need for actual pres-
ence of representatives of the different interests in the process of deliberation is to
admit that this process will inevitably be marked by strategic interaction, or by factors
that should be seen as spurious from that idealized point of view: even arguments or
the reference to supposedly impartial rules may turn out to be rationalizations in the
negative sense of the word. Looked at in the perspective of discussions dealing with
“proceduralization” understood as a way to make actual processes of collective delib-
eration to get closer to the model of authentic debate based exclusively on argu-
ments, this seems clearly contradictory, for restricting the role of “competence” and
amplifying the space of open strategic interaction among interests appear as a way to
improve the results of deliberation processes with regard to something that should be
central to that model, that is, the ability actually to consider different viewpoints.
As indicated by the context of Sejersted’s discussion, an important ramification
of such problems is the question of corporatism or “corporate pluralism” (as some,
including Dahl and Sejersted himself, have called it, with certain ambiguous over-
tones).16 Corporatism involves deliberations in institutional spaces that bypass the
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traditional mechanisms of electoral and parliamentary representation. In this
regard, the resistance opposed to corporatism in the name of democracy is well-
known, for mechanisms of corporatist deliberation also frequently involve some
degree of informality, lesser visibility and the creation of monopolies of representa-
tion, besides supposing a rather important (“authoritarian”?) role by the state as the
promoter of corporatist encounters. However, corporatism and its supposedly neg-
ative traits of this sort (though disguised under such labels as “corporate pluralism”
or “neocorporatism”) have evolved, in countries with a long liberal-democratic tra-
dition, from the socio-political dynamics of a previous and authentically liberal and
pluralist structure itself – which occurs largely as a mere response to the strong
incentive for interests with less “natural” access to the state, for being to start with
less provided with power resources of various sorts, to organize themselves so as to
compensate this deficiency. Moreover, the feature of democratization stressed by
Sejersted with regard to this process is undeniable, as corporatism makes possible
for a category of agents (the workers) previously less present in socio-economic
decisions of crucial interest to them to increase their participation in such decisions
beyond the indirect influence that can be exercised through electoral mechanisms,
by getting functional representation as workers in corporatist circles. This has been
seen by some authors, with good reasons, as a decisive development even from a
point of view prone to emphasize the importance of electoral democracy, for it
would be a crucial part of the “social compromise” that has underlain democratic sta-
bility after the Second World War, particularly in the countries openly adhering to
social-democratic arrangements. In this perspective, corporatism associates itself
with the welfare state and the Marshallian social enrichment of the very idea of cit-
izenship (besides its civil and political dimensions). And the new developments tak-
ing place with intensified globalization, by sending again to the rough sphere of the
market the elements pertaining to the social dimension of citizenship and compro-
mising corporatist structures, can also be seen as jeopardizing democracy itself.17
Furthermore, embroiled in all this there are also the complicated problems of
identity. To start with, these problems underlie, of course, the above-mentioned
question of the extent to which we have identification and trust between represen-
tatives and represented. But questions of identity apply in a peculiar way to major-
ity rule itself, which involves, as part of the assumption of “degrees of unanimity”,
the one that agents or voters are interchangeable and their wills or manifestations of
preference can be aggregated. This amounts to treating identities, in any more or
less ambitious sense of the word and particularly in their connections to collective
categories of different sorts, as irrelevant: people (voters) have only somewhat
myopic interests or preferences (“given” or “exogenous” preferences), or, at least,
they are assumed to be similar enough with regard to fundamental factors of identi-
ty so as to allow that issues of intensity of preference or of preference formation and
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transformation (which do involve identity and may add up, for instance, to charac-
ter-planning) be put aside. This is made especially clear by the contrast, to which
Arend Lijphart in particular has given attention, between majoritarian systems and
“consociational” or “consensual” systems: the latter emphasize precisely the need to
give proper representation to shared identities whose importance for the people
involved (having to do with territorial identities leading to federalism, ethnic or
religious identities, and so on) should forbid that they be dealt with in terms of
merely counting heads, with the possible consequence that collective identities of
deep significance be permanently placed in a minority position and their interests of
whatever nature disregarded.18
I would like to add a few observations to this. The first is that problems analo-
gous to those of consociational representation are involved in the theme of corpo-
ratism. In other words, corporatism has to do not only with “interests” in a restrict-
ed sense, but also with identities: it has to do with the representation of a certain
category of people which, though referring to occupational criteria, may acquire a
significance for the definition of individual identities that turns out to be analogous
to the one we have with ethnic or religious groups. Actually, a decisive part of the
process leading to social-democracy, as well as of its importance for the stabilization
of democracy as such, is linked to the fact that the inclusion of workers’ organiza-
tions in corporatist deliberations helped to neutralize or reduce the political impor-
tance of the relevant identities and, by the same token, to reduce the importance of
the risk (or the perception of risk) of anti-capitalist revolution in the day to day pol-
itics of the countries involved.
The second observation concerns the fact that the latter aspect (reducing the
political importance or saliency of collective identities) corresponds to a trait of a
general nature at play in the process of establishing and consolidating democracy, of
which the social-democratic experiment in its various forms was one case, now pos-
sibly at risk. The relevance of stressing this is to point to another facet of the seem-
ing paradox mentioned above: representing interests, that is, creating an arena for
the strategic play of interests to assume an institutional character, though apparent-
ly in conflict with the idealized model of debate, turns out to be a decisive way to
create a set of conditions that favor the actual operation, in various settings, of
processes of collective deliberation, instead of the threat or actuality of open con-
flict.This has been dealt with in the literature, for instance, under the label of  “seg-
mentation”, with which the tendency for problems of identity to unfold into bel-
ligerent dispositions may be neutralized and the political process may come to
assume a “de-ideologized” nature eventually marked by tolerance and the willingness
to negotiate or debate.19 But let us note something else: if this set of conditions
favors the creation of spaces of discussion and deliberation, it also favors the gener-
al operation of the second type of mechanisms that have been related above to Dahl’s
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criterion of personal choice and to autonomy, that is, market mechanisms oriented
by the “cool” and perhaps “rational” search for one’s interests.
IV 
Let us look for a moment at the state as such in connection to the general problem
of the difficulties in the relationships between the “realistic” consideration of inter-
ests and (occasionally antagonistic) identities, on the one hand, and the proper
attention to aspects leading to convergence and solidarity that are assumed by the
ideal model of deliberation, on the other. The central issue here has long been
whether the state should be seen as the chief instrument of convergence or solidar-
ity (of production of collective power, or power over “nature”, to be exercised in the
interest of all) or as the strategic instrument of domination of some people over oth-
ers (or as part of the problem of the distribution of power among citizens). Some rel-
evant observations can be made if we consider the issues by reference to the many
(and confused) discussions – within or outside Marxist circles – on the so-called
“autonomy of the political” (often taken to mean autonomy of the state itself).
There are a few clearly different ways in which the formula of the “autonomy of
the political” is usually understood, including an analytic or methodological one and
others that might be called “substantive” or theoretical. If we take the formula in
methodological terms, in which it refers to a problem of causal relationships
between different spheres in competing analytic models, there seems to be no way
to avoid resorting to an old postulate in the social sciences which gives a “sociolog-
ical” answer to the basic query involved: the characteristics assumed by the state are
seen as dependent on a substratum corresponding to the social distribution of power.
In this perspective, the fact that the state turns out to be, to some significant extent,
either the expression of the will of all (the public interest) or rather a tool appro-
priated by some and used in the last analysis to repress and exploit the others
depends, in principle, on the form of the play of interests that takes place at the level
of society itself and on who prevails in it (Marxists would say it depends on the class
struggle). All the postulate amounts to is looking at the state as part, after all, of
society, and it is not at all incompatible with recognizing the occurrence, occasion-
ally, of a large degree of “initiative” on the part of the state. But two things of inter-
est to us can be said if we start from this analytic or methodological postulate.
Firstly, adhering to it does not amount to giving any determinate answer to the
questions involved in the various “substantive” meanings attributed to the formula of
the “autonomy of the political”. Three such substantive meanings can be distin-
guished: the one of the extent to which the state is socially “neutral”, or neutral with
regard to class interests; the one of the “presence” of the state or of its just-men-
tioned capacity of initiative (“stateness”); and the one of the extent to which the
ESP1_p131_152.qxd  11/3/05  21:39  Page 11
Revista Direito GV, São Paulo, p. 131-152, 2005. Edição especial 1. 
DELIBERATION, INTERESTS AND PLURALISM? : FÁBIO W. REIS142
political arena has been properly institutionalized and thus protected from the
changing results of the day to day vicissitudes of the sociopolitical process (the
“autonomy of the political arena”, as Huntington’s old phrase has it, in contrast to
the “praetorian” condition where institutions are weak and social conflicts express
themselves through the use of whatever means, including violent ones, directly in
the political arena).20 Secondly, and more important to us: the crucial – both theo-
retical and practical – problem from the political point of view, the one of estab-
lishing and consolidating democracy  (which is clearly related to the latter
Huntingtonian perspective) reveals itself as something that turns around a certain
articulation of precisely those three substantive meanings of the “autonomy of the
political”, in the framework provided by the methodological postulate. For just as
we can have a state which actively intervenes because it is not neutral, or because some
of the actors involved in social conflict have been able to control it once and for all
(consider the idea of “dictatorship of the proletariat”, or the experience of the
authoritarian Brazilian regime of 1964, where we had the combination of strong
interventionism with an obvious bias as to the social links and loyalties of those in
charge of the state), so we can also have stable and consolidated (institutionalized)
rules of the game, even formally democratic, which nonetheless turn out to conse-
crate open or veiled relationships of domination (consider the idea of “structural
dependence” of the state on the interests of capitalists as something inherent to cap-
italism, or the diagnosis of the “technostructure” made by John Kenneth Galbraith
many years ago with regard to the United States).
The upshot is that, insofar as the state is concerned, the problem of democracy,
in an ambitious sense of the word, is precisely the one of creating the conditions
(which are by force largely social, though inevitably including the challenge of “arti-
ficial” institution-building) for the state to be neutral: how to establish a “social com-
promise” that may allow the state itself an important degree of autonomy in the face
of strategic relationships and likely asymmetries in the dynamics of private interests,
so that it becomes possible for the state to intervene not only to guarantee the “liber-
al rights”, but also to try and compensate for inequalities in the social distribution of
power and to ensure the “positive liberties” in which everyone may come to have
better conditions of self-realization.
Now, this conception of an autonomous state is clearly in conflict, in a way,
with the ideal of “popular sovereignty”. The latter supposes a homogeneous public
to which the state should be subjected, whereas the above suggestions refer to
unequal societies and to the risk that subjecting the state to society may result in
its subjection to the powerful citizens and in making it into the famous “commit-
tee” for the promotion of their interests. But there is another point to be stressed
in connection to our main concerns here. It has to do with the fact that, in spite of
all the previous emphasis on the need properly to represent interests in the state,
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there is no way to avoid recognizing that the state we want must be, to a large
extent, a paternalistic state – that is, a state that is not restricted to reacting to the
differential ability to exercise pressure on the part of the various private foci of
interests or identities. The recognition of this requisite is reinforced by the impos-
sibility of representing all interests, which in many cases never reach the stage of
becoming vocal and affirmative. Let us put aside the question of the degree to
which a properly “virtuous” disposition would have to be enshrined in such a pater-
nalistic state, or else if we could count upon efforts at realistic institution-building
of the kind seen as characterizing the ideas of the “Founding Fathers” of the United
States, in which the public interest is somehow safeguarded through the institu-
tional play of egoisms or “factions”: the main thrust of our argument certainly rec-
ommends the latter, but there seems to be no escape from some degree of appro-
priate cultural or sociopsychological conditions in operation in the society at large.
But one further point can be made, as a relevant ramification of the previous obser-
vations. To wit, the old problem of the tense relationships between capitalism and
democracy, usually taken in terms of political democracy, actually occurs in a cru-
cial way in connection with the question of social democracy: not only the possi-
bility of “revolution” – or of the rupture, however it may take place, of prevailing
socio-economic power relationships – is perhaps the decisive factor in conditioning
democratic instability, but also the operation of an effective democracy cannot
avoid somehow facing up to the aim of social democracy.
V 
Before closing these notes, let me go back to the idea of the operation of market
mechanisms and explore some ramifications of it. Despite both the negative and
positive mythologies that surround the notion of market in age-old political con-
frontations, I think it can provide the focal point for a sort of “realistic utopia” capa-
ble of reconciling the tension between the two dimensions of, say, “solidarity” and
“interests” stressed above in various ways. If we consider again the idea of autonomy
as a crucial democratic value, there is no doubt that, whenever we are concerned
with actually joint or collective decisions, this value leads to debate and deliberation
and, if possible, to unanimous agreement.
But there is another aspect, besides the one of costs and practical difficulties, to
the objections that can be raised to viewing deliberation, whatever its doctrinaire
importance in the last analysis, as a proper foundation for a viable conception of
politics and democracy. Many years ago, the economist Abba Lerner wrote that “an
economic transaction is a solved political problem”.21 Now, resorting to collective
deliberation cannot avoid the assumption that fundamental difficulties at the level
of conflicts of interests have been solved, or that some form of “constitutional”
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accommodation in the coexistence of relevant interests has been achieved (it would
be possible to say, certainly with better reasons than in the case of economic trans-
actions, that “a parliament is a solved political problem”). Note that Habermas him-
self, dealing in Between Facts and Norms with the cultural pluralism of the informal
public sphere (in which the sphere of formal deliberation of a parliamentary kind
nourishes itself), emphasizes the fact that it depends on “the support of a societal
basis in which equal rights of citizenship have become socially effective”, which
points not only to “political” (or “formal”) democracy, but also to “social” democra-
cy: “Only in an egalitarian public of citizens that has emerged from the confines of
class and thrown off the millennia-old shackles of social stratification and exploita-
tion can the potential of an unleashed cultural pluralism fully develop”.22
In any case, it seems inevitable to admit that, in the conditions proper to large
and complex societies, the form par excellence to ensure autonomy at manageable
“internal” or organizational costs involves reducing the space in which collective deliber-
ation is necessary and trying to create the conditions for people to act on their own
with minimal “external” costs as well.The indispensable efforts at institution-build-
ing and “proceduralization” will then be guided, at the most encompassing level, by
the idea that decisions will be made, to the largest possible extent, by the dispersed
actors themselves (which does not preclude resorting to procedures more akin to
the deliberative model wherever feasible), and the balance with regard to the con-
cern with both “internal” and “external” costs will be sought by reference to princi-
ples akin to the principle of “subsidiaryness” that tends to be invoked in discussions
on federalism, which supposes that decisions are to be transferred to a “higher” level
(from the level of individuals to that of increasingly large and encompassing collec-
tivities) only as the nature of problems requires it.
This perspective, that some might wish to see as just “liberal” in the European
sense of the word, could invoke in its support even the anarchist model of the com-
munist society depicted by Marx in The German Ideology, where individualism and
individual autonomy are taken to the point of capricious behavior – despite the obvi-
ous lack of sensitivity Marx displays, in this regard, toward the problem of “exter-
nalities”, whence his bet on suppressing the state. But taking the notion of market as
a crucial reference for the attempt at synthesis suggested here finds perhaps its
clearest classic support in Max Weber’s work.As Weber’s analyses of the market have
shown, it can be described as the locus of “sociability among strangers”, in which we
have the synthesis between “society” and “societal action” (distinguished by the
“rational” search for interests, the “rough” side of the market that I linked above to
its expansion with globalization), on the one hand, and “community” or “communal
action” (distinguished by the feeling of being part of a whole), on the other.23 The
communal aspect of the market involves the operation of a principle of solidarity,
however “thin”, and the adherence to norms that regulate and mitigate the general-
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ized pursuit of interests, thus ensuring that interest-based exchanges and interac-
tions may recur and endure without degenerating into a Hobbesian situation of gen-
eralized fraud and, eventually, belligerence.
Moreover, by claiming the notion of market as distinguished by such traits, with
the reference to the autonomy of agents (and thus to their equality, which excludes
power relationships and so oligopolies and monopolies from the market in a strict
sense), I can ascribe to it a scope and a relevance that go far beyond the sphere con-
ventionally thought of as “economic”, making it appropriate to speak of a sort of
“political market” as a regulating idea capable of encompassing important aspects of
the democratic ideal.This suggestion can best be appreciated through a reevaluation
of the notion of interest itself. Current usage tends to link “interests” above all to the
economic sphere defined in a rather narrow way, in connection with values or objec-
tives of a “material” nature. But if we approach the notion of interest as generically
equivalent to the idea of “self-affirmation” (or “self-distinction”, to give Pizzorno his
due), we can then see that it is logically intertwined with the ideas of power and of
strategic interaction – and there clearly is no reason to restrict the category of the
market, seen as the locus of the play of interests, to the economic arena. Actually,
the reference to “interests”, “strategy” and “power”, as well as to the affinities among
them, turns out to provide a fundamental criterion for an analytic definition of pol-
itics as such, by contrast to the blunt reference to the state as a sort of concrete
“piece” or part of society that we often find, either explicitly or implicitly.According
to this analytic definition, politics would consist of strategic interactions and the
search for self-affirmation or for power in any concrete institutional or social con-
text, independently of the specific content of goals that may be the object of con-
flict or cooperation in one sphere of interaction or another – that is, material or
“economic” goals or goals relating to religion, class, race, ethnic groups, gender,
generation, and what not. In other words, politics, understood as the interplay
among interests and its eventual accommodation, has no content of its own and is
socially ubiquitous: it penetrates social relationships of all kinds and pertains to the
“social basis” of conflicts and to the potential or actual foci of solidarity and group
identification that become engaged in such conflicts – just as it pertains also to the
organizational expression of conflicts and solidarities at the level conventionally
referred to as “political” or “politico-institutional”, where the factor of convergence
represented by an appropriately complex and effective state affirms itself, lest the
play of interests should lead to Hobbes.24 Again, as previously said, the deliberative
utopia can be seen as a guiding idea, and so a relevant component of the definition
of politics, involving a bet on the just-mentioned organizational (and parliamentary)
expression of conflicts; but it is precisely the unquestionable centrality of strategy,
interests and conflicts in politics that justifies, as we just saw, looking at deliberation
as a “solved political problem”.
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Of course, by thus amplifying the reach of the notion of market we end up with
the old idea of the pluralist and individualist society. In this society, the prevailing
conception of civic virtue is a rather mild one, understood as “tolerance” – precise-
ly the sociability or solidarity “among strangers”, or the “out-group morality” dealt
with by Wolfgang Schluchter,25 which is in clear contrast to psychological fusion and
effusiveness and to the risk of fanaticism and belligerent leanings that go with them.
Provided with this form of civic morality, autonomous individuals are able not only
to choose their associates and loyalties in different specific spheres, but also, as we
noted above with regard to autonomy as self-control, their personal identity itself.
So, the ability of individuals do “decenter” and detach themselves from society,
besides its obvious connections to a “nobler” sort of autonomy (or to real autonomy)
and to the possibility of neutralizing the political relevance of questions of identity
and related ones, becomes the condition for a reflective sort of solidarity which stops
short of the negative overtones of the sheer immersion in society and identification
with it. To be sure, there is a clearly paradoxical aspect to this, from which there
seems to be no escape: if we are to have the actual institutionalization or enshrine-
ment of a democratic and pluralistic culture in this sense, so as to avoid the problem-
atic condition in which individuals would be supposed judiciously to ponder their
actions at every moment, it will be necessary, on the one hand, that an ethic broad-
ly shared by the collectivity as such comes to operate routinely; but, on the other
hand, this ethic – as such inevitably “conventional” – will have to be of such a nature
that it stimulates individual autonomy and “post-conventional” forms of morality.
In a way akin to the idea of a market in operation, all this amounts to eliminat-
ing or minimizing the role of ascription and of the inequalities associated with it,
even though the relevant choices are inevitably exerted over a “raw material” which
is itself always social, or socially given or imposed: there is, of course, no point in
looking “back” to a pre-social “state of nature” where one would supposedly be
authentically oneself. Besides the links one might point here to a long tradition of
thought in general sociological theory, there is certainly no need, with regard to the
more directly political implications involved, to mention the long “pluralist” line of
thought ranging, for instance, from Tocqueville through William Kornhauser to
Robert Dahl. But perhaps there should be a mention to a book of a few years ago by
Ernest Gellner, Condições da Liberdade. 26
The reason for this mention concerns one of the negative models of society to
which the positive model of the pluralist society (called the “civil” society by Gellner)
is opposed. These negative models usually include two “modern” categories: the
“mass” society, where atomized and socially uprooted individuals relate without social
or group intermediations of any sort with the state, and the “totalitarian” society,
where an invading state seeks to control all aspects of individual life and socio-polit-
ical interactions.27 But they include also the “traditional” or “communal” society.
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Being present both in Kornhauser and in Gellner, this model of society is elaborated
at length by Gellner, who stresses in a particularly vigorous way its negative traits.
Communal society is depicted by him as “strongly making the individual a mere part
of a social unit” and as imposing upon him or her a “suffocating” identity, which is in
conflict with the “modern conception of liberty” that “includes the requirement that
identities be chosen and not ascribed”. Many of such negative and “suffocating” traits
are seen by Gellner to be also present, still today, in the Islamic Umma, the “commu-
nity based on the faith shared by all and in the implementation of its law”, as well as
in the peculiar “secular Umma of Marxism”.28 But it is especially interesting, from
the point of view of our concerns here, the fact that Gellner, resorting to Fustel de
Coulanges, does not hesitate to include under the negative characterization of the
communal society the “ancient city” itself of Greece and Rome which provides the
idealized reference for the celebration of civic-republican virtues – and, of course,
for much of the deliberation literature. After all, as we have been recently reminded
also by Ellen Meiksins Wood,29 there were no civil rights in Athens. And Gellner’s
“civil society” as a positive model has to be contrasted also, which is done by him in
an emphatic manner, to the civic society so dreamed of by many. Actually, Gellner is
explicitly critical even of the idealized (or civic) view of “civil society” to be found in
much of the recent literature on this concept, where – at odds with its classic use by
Hegel, for instance, to whom civil society is the space of interests and particularisms,
by contrast to the universalism of the state – it is associated with a public-oriented or
“altruistic” motivation. It is quite obvious (and up to a point unquestionably “good”)
that, besides interest-groups proper, we can also have public-oriented groups or asso-
ciations of various kinds as participants in the pluralist society. But the fact that diver-
gent (and militant) conceptions of the public good may often get willingly involved
in strictly strategic and even belligerent interactions, in contrast to the tolerance that
the pragmatism of interests tends to induce, speaks in favor of Gellner’s perspective.
And this perspective should be kept in mind especially in face of the claim, by some
of the recent champions of civil society, to the effect that, due to its “virtuous” char-
acter, the latter might be expected largely to replace and dispense with the state by
becoming a sort of diffuse source of convergence and cohesion.
I’ll leave Gellner at that. But I would like to close this section on market and
pluralist or civil society with a little journalistic story, which seems to me to bring
interesting suggestions in connection with the play between market mechanisms, on
the one hand, and the conventional political and electoral arena, including the prob-
lem of regulation by the state, on the other. A few years ago, apropos of the mani-
festations that took place in Prague on the occasion of one of the IMF and World
Bank meetings, the journal The Economist discussed the role of non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) that have been frequently involved in such events.30 Besides
talking about the rapid globalization of NGOs and the efficacy of their action, as
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well as the possible confusions occurring in their positions on such issues as the
relationships between poverty and capitalist development, The Economist goes on to
raise the problem of the democratic legitimacy of their behavior. Who elected the
NGOs? Why can they feel authorized to call into question the decisions or acts of
“law-abiding corporations”, or to claim for the change of policies by democratical-
ly elected governments?
There is, no doubt, one point regarding which these interrogations are certain-
ly well taken. It has to do with the extent to which, in the actions of protest by
NGOs, legal norms are observed or, in the contrary, they are willing to resort to
violence. It seems that this willingness does exist in the definition of some of the
aims to be sought by the groups that oppose globalization.
If this crucial reservation is kept in mind, however, to ask for the democratic
credentials of NGOs in electoral terms is clearly improper. It is unquestionably fit-
ting to the dynamics of democracy that interest groups or categories, or groups
that share opinions on problems of public interest, may seek autonomously to
organize themselves so as to be able effectively to articulate and promote their
interests and opinions. But there is more to this.There is an obvious question which
is not raised by The Economist, though it should emerge rather naturally in a context
where we are dealing with the vigorous transnational affirmation of market mech-
anisms, seen with propitious eyes by the journal: should we ask for the electoral-
democratic credentials of “lawabiding” corporations, whose decisions frequently
affect in so dramatic a way the lives of so many people? One might recall here
Robert Dahl’s perspective in a work of many years ago, where the author, calling
large corporations “pseudoprivate” precisely due to the public impact of their deci-
sions, stresses the need for democratizing such decisions through some form of
representation of affected interests.31
If requiring electoral-democratic credentials in the case of agents of the market
conventionally seen in economic terms seems absurd, despite agreement on the
obvious need for state regulation, the point is to emphasize that perfectly analogous
market-mechanisms do have an important place in the socio-political arena as well,
though state regulation is obviously needed also here. The general problem, once
more, is how to reconcile in an adequate way the public interest with the autonomy
of agents in the search for their goals of whatever nature. And if safeguarding the
public interest supposes regulation – of which electoral procedures can be seen as
an instrument – capable of ensuring democratic values, the autonomy that express-
es itself directly in the market (or in “civil society”) is also a crucial democratic
value. Up to what point should we regulate democratically and politically the eco-
nomic sphere, and how far should we allow the autonomy of the market to penetrate
the conventionally “political” sphere (no doubt including the sphere of the “civil soci-
ety” in the sense of the recent literature on this concept)?
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VI 
In the world of globalization and of the transnational affirmation of economic and
financial markets, there seems to be no doubt on the desirability not only of rein-
forcing, if possible, the regulatory powers of states at the national level (though we
now have states and states, with very different capabilities with regard to exerting
influence on national and international spaces), but also of effectively establishing
the functional equivalent of the state, and so a factor of convergence and control, at
the transnational or international level itself where those markets tend increasingly
to operate. It is also clear that, however difficult and unlikely the fulfillment of this
task may be (among other things for the asymmetries themselves between the
national states and the lack of a substratum of real community at the planetary scale),
instituting the functional equivalent of the national state at the international level
would involve creating forums of debate and deliberation that might be far more
effective than the ones presently available.
Perhaps less clear, however, is the need to create and expand the market itself.
For, the transnational overflow of economic and financial activities notwithstanding,
there is a clear sense in which markets have actually been shrinking. I refer to the
Hobbesian feature of globalization, in which the harsh new competition of a global-
ized world is accompanied by new forms of inequality and exclusion, with the crisis
of Keynesianism and social-democracy, unemployment, the diffusion of informal and
precarious kinds of work relationships, increasing urban violence and, especially in
the United States, “hypercriminalization” and the explosion of incarceration rates and
of the correctional population.32 Of course, in a country like Brazil, the impact of
exposure to these new processes will tend to have a cumulative character, in which
they combine with the huge inequality and caste-like forms of social stratification
inherited from our centuries-long experience with slavery. Needless to say, for most
of those submitted to the material and intellectual deprivations associated with such
conditions, the prospects of autonomous participation in significant processes of col-
lective deliberation are paltry indeed.And we should probably keep in mind the need
for long-run developments in which, among other things, indispensable paternalism
on the part of the state might help create the conditions for more widespread and
appropriate access to the material and intellectual resources needed for the signifi-
cant emergence of identities eventually capable of autonomy and political expres-
sion, instead of the increase in criminal behavior we now have as the most evident
manifestation of our lasting defficiencies. In this perspective, “creating market” can
be read as creating the conditions for competition to stop being, for many, a fraudu-
lent game, or national competitiveness a synonym to social exclusion.
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* In preparing this paper, I had to work in a rather hasty way. So, as someone has said (I don’t recall who), I did-
n’t have time to be brief, or perhaps to be as organized, tight and cogent as might be desirable. But I hope my main pur-
pose – to confront and complement a philosophical or doctrinaire way of looking at deliberative democracy with a
“sociological” and “realistic” analytic perspective – is served well enough, and that the paper in its present form may be
of some help in our discussions.
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